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ARGUMENT 
Avoiding the principal issues presented in this appeal, the Brief of Appellee recites at 
length the content of the motions filed with the trial court. Mr. Stratton's response is simply that 
since the written stipulation was signed by Mrs. Stratton she should be bound by it. This 
response begs the issue. Mr. Stratton does not deny or dispute any of the essential facts. 
Referring the court to the arguments set forth in Mrs. Stratton's brief, the following is a 
synopsis of the relevant facts and reasoning which support granting Mrs. Stratton relief and 
reversing the ruling of the trial court. 
I. PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESENTED NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
A. Petitioner Moved to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce Based upon Evidence 
Discovered After Petitioner Signed the Stipulation 
1. Mr. Stratton claims that Mrs. Stratton failed to meet her burden of showing that 
the evidence discovered after she signed the stipulation could not have discovered by her prior to 
her acquiescence to the terms of the stipulation. 
2. It is not disputed that Mrs. Stratton diligently utilized the discovery tools available 
to her in the divorce litigation in order to become fully informed of all assets acquired during the 
marriage. (Rec. 37, 38, 42, 55, 58-59, 143) It is not disputed that Mr. Stratton failed to disclose 
the existence of his interests in an executive bonus plan and certain parcels of real property in his 
responses to Mrs. Stratton's discovery. (Rec. 56,153) 
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3. It is not disputed that Mrs. Stratton became informed of the existence of those 
concealed assets through the voluntary disclosure by a co-worker of Mr. Stratton. (Rec. 234) 
4. The ten (10) day time limitation within Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(2) is 
inapplicable because there was no trial in this matter, or alternatively, because Mrs. Stratton 
exercised reasonable diligence in her discovery efforts prior to signing the stipulation and Mr. 
Stratton perjuriously responded to her discovery, luring her into signing the stipulation without 
full knowledge of all of the facts. 
5. Mrs. Stratton is entitled to relief under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b) as she 
undisputedly sought relief from the judgment, order or proceeding within a reasonable time. It is 
not controverted that Mrs. Stratton was surprised to learn of the undisclosed assets. (Rec. 197, 
234) 
6. It is undisputed that the trial court denied Mrs. Stratton's motion to set aside the 
decree because her initial motion did not disclose the identity of the informant or specifically 
identify the newly discovered marital assets. (Rec. 517-518; Addendum, Exhibit 1, Appellant's 
Brief) 
7. Mrs. Stratton moved the trial court for a rehearing on that issue and supplemented 
her motion with an affidavit signed under oath by the irformant that specifically described the 
marital assets that were newly discovered. Mrs. Stratton further explained to the trial court the 
reason why the informant had earlier declined to be identified. (Rec. 526-528) 
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8. The trial court erred in refusing Mrs. Stratton relief on her motion for rehearing 
when, by submitting the sworn affidavit, she met her burden of showing that the newly 
discovered evidence was of sufficient substance that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result. 
B. The Evidence Discovered was Material to the Division of Property and was 
Sufficient in Scope to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce 
9. Mrs. Stratton sought relief from the stipulation from the trial court because the 
additional information changed the underlying basis for the bargain of the stipulation, and the 
existence of additional marital property would affect the outcome to Mrs. Stratton. 
10. The trial court's failure to consider all assets acquired during the marriage was 
reversible error. As set forth in Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), all 
assets acquired during the marriage must be considered by the trial court when making an 
equitable distribution. The trial court failed to consider all the assets acquired during the 
marriage because the trial court affirmed the entry of the Decree of Divorce based upon the 
stipulation that did not distribute the marital assets discovered by Mrs. Stratton. Mrs. Stratton 
was prevented from having full information by Mr. Stratton's failure to identify all assets 
acquired during the marriage, namely, the executive bonus plan and the parcels of real property. 
The trial court's decision to not set aside the Decree of Divorce based upon Mrs. Stratton's 
discovery of new evidence was clearly erroneous. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENFORCING THE STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES 
11. Mr. Stratton argues that because Mrs. Stratton signed the Stipulation and the 
Stipulation was in writing, Mrs. Stratton should be bound thereby. Mr. Stratton's argument fails 
to address the real issue, that is, Mrs. Stratton's petition to the trial court that if she had known of 
the other undisclosed assets that were acquired during the marriage, she would not have signed 
the Stipulation. 
12. Mrs. Stratton executed the Stipulation based upon information provided by Mr. 
Stratton. Mrs. Stratton justifiably relied on the validity and reliability of Mr. Stratton's under 
oath responses to her discovery requests. When Mrs. Stratton learned that the information 
provided by Mr. Stratton was incomplete or inaccurate, Mrs. Stratton, directly and through 
counsel, attempted to repudiate the Stipulation prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
13. Mr. Stratton's continuous argument about the validity of the antenuptial 
agreement is a red herring. The validity of the antenuptial agreement had been challenged by 
Mrs. Stratton because she had learned that Mr. Stratton had not fully disclosed all of his 
premarital property. The contest had been reserved for trial. Regardless of the outcome of that 
dispute, the antenuptial agreement did not purport to protect assets acquired by the parties during 
their marriage absent certain circumstances. Mrs. Stratton engaged in discovery in her diligent 
attempt to inform herself of all of the assets of the parties. Her agreement to the terms of the 
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stipulation which included the waiver of her challenge to the validity of the antenuptial 
agreement, was based upon Mr. Stratton's untruthful responses to her discovery. 
14. The issue before the appellate court is whether or not the discovery of assets 
acquired during the marriage that were not disclosed prior to the execution of a Stipulation is of a 
sufficient basis to void the Stipulation. Mr. Stratton's bad act of hiding assets must not be 
rewarded by denying Mrs. Stratton a full and fair opportunity for an equitable distribution of the 
marital assets. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SETTING ASIDE THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE BASED UPON THE ACTIONS LEADING TO THE ENTRY OF THE 
DECREE 
15. Mrs. Stratton informed Mr. Stratton that she had discovered new evidence and 
that she no longer wished to be bound by the Stipulation she had signed. Mr. Stratton argues that 
there is no basis in Utah law for a party to unilaterally repudiate an enforceable stipulation. 
Although Mr. Stratton's argument may or may not be accurate, at the time Mrs. Stratton 
attempted to repudiate her agreement, the Decree of Divorce had not been entered, in fact, it had 
not yet been delivered to the trial court. 
16. The issue of the validity and enforceability of the Stipulation should have been 
presented to the trial court for a specific determination as to whether or not Mrs. Stratton was 
bound by the Stipulation despite her discovery of new evidence of non-disclosed assets. This, 
however, was not the case. Mr. Stratton rushed to the court and obtained the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce based upon the signed stipulation without informing the trial court that there was an 
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issue as to the underlying agreement to the signed Stipulation. It was clearly erroneous for the 
trial court to fail to set aside the Decree of Divorce when presented with evidence of the nature of 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of Mrs. Stratton's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and to Void Stipulation should be reversed. 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Decree when presented 
with evidence that Mr. Stratton had failed to disclose assets acquired during the marriage. 
The evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient to allow Mrs. Stratton to obtain a 
different result than that contained in the Decree. Mrs. Stratton alleged sufficient grounds to 
void the Stipulation on the grounds that there had not been full disclosure and as such, she could 
not have knowingly waived her rights. 
The trial court abused its discretion by erroneously concluding that the Stipulation could 
not be overturned because of the applicability of the antenuptial agreement. The erroneous 
conclusion of law resulted in substantial prejudice to Mrs. Stratton. 
The trial court had the equitable power to set aside the Decree and allow Mrs. Stratton to 
move to void the stipulation. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the 
Decree of Divorce that was entered on the basis of a Stipulation that was signed without full 
disclosure and was repudiated prior to the entry of the Decree. 
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Mrs. Stratton respectfully requests the decision of the trial court be reversed and this 
matter reinstated in the Third District Court to allow her to proceed on her motion to void the 
Stipulation and to void the antenuptial, and to allow this matter to proceed to trial. 
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